Nepotism as a Systemic Threat: The Erosion of Statehood in Uzbekistan Under the Guise of Reform

Uzbekistan today активно projects an image of reform, openness, and renewal. Yet behind this carefully constructed façade, an old and dangerous practice is becoming increasingly visible — nepotism, which is not merely persisting but risks once again becoming an informal foundation for the distribution of power. This is no longer a matter of isolated ethical lapses; it is a systemic threat undermining the very nature of statehood.

The recent past should have served as a harsh lesson. The case of Gulnara Karimova was not an anomaly, but a predictable outcome of a system where personal proximity to power substitutes for institutions. Her pervasive influence across politics, business, and international affairs exposed the depth of institutional distortion. The consequences were severe: international disrepute, entrenched corruption, and a profound erosion of public trust.

All the more concerning, then, is the emergence of similar patterns today. The expanding role of Saida Mirziyoyeva in key areas of state and information policy is framed as part of the reform agenda. In substance, however, it reflects the same underlying logic — the concentration of influence within a narrow circle defined not by institutions, but by familial ties. The issue is not about individual capability; it is about principle: can a state credibly claim reform while access to power remains contingent on closeness to the ruling family?

Regional experience offers a clear answer. In Turkmenistan, the transfer of power from Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow to Serdar Berdimuhamedow entrenched a model of de facto hereditary rule, where institutions serve largely decorative functions. In Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon has systematically consolidated authority by placing family members in key positions, reducing political competition to a minimum. These are not cautionary tales — they are fully realized models of institutional degradation.

Nepotism is particularly corrosive because it operates gradually. It does not dismantle a system overnight; it hollows it out from within. First, the principle of equal access is weakened. Then, competition disappears. Finally, the state apparatus loses its professional foundation. What remains is a closed, quasi-corporate structure serving a narrow set of private interests.

The most damaging consequence, however, is the collapse of trust. When society sees that rules are not applied equally, belief in fairness исчезает — and with it, faith in reform itself. In such conditions, transformation becomes performative, and the language of change turns into a political cover for the preservation of old practices.

Uzbekistan now faces not simply a choice, but a test of the authenticity of its реформ agenda. Either the state demonstrates a genuine rejection of nepotism as a governing principle, or it inevitably slides back into a familiar model of “family rule.” In that case, the question will no longer be about the pace of reform, but whether reform exists at all.